Embarking from the concept of uniform payo¤ security (Monteiro P.K., Page F.H, J Econ Theory 134: 566-575, 2007), we introduce two other uniform conditions and then study the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games where the sum of the payo¤ functions is not necessarily upper semicontinuous.
Introduction
We study the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in compact Borel games in which the sum of the payo¤ functions is not necessarily upper semicontinuous. The existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a game is often shown by invoking Reny's equilibrium existence theorem (Reny, 1999) , according to which a compact Borel game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if its mixed extension is betterreply secure. 3 In its turn, better-reply security is implied by two conditions, namely reciprocal (or weak reciprocal) upper semicontinuity and payo¤ security. As was shown by Simon (1987, Example 5) , not every reciprocally upper semicontinuous game has a reciprocally upper semicontinuous mixed extension. Consequently, imposing the assumption that the mixed extension of a game is reciprocally upper semicontinuous is pretty close to assuming explicitly that the sum of the payo¤ functions is upper semicontinuous. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, Theorem 5b ) provided a set of su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in reciprocally upper semicontinuous games. Establishing the payo¤ security of the mixed extension of a game is also often quite challenging. The concept of uniform payo¤ security, introduced by Monteiro and Page (2007) , makes the problem considerably more tractable in games where it is applicable, including catalog games (Page and Monteiro, 2003) and voting models (Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok, 2007) . In this paper we propose two modi…cations of the uniform payo¤ security condition in order to broaden the class of games in which the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria follows from a uniform, easily tractable condition First we consider games with diagonally transfer continuous mixed extensions. Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) showed that the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in diagonally transfer continuous games follows from a generalization of the Knuster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (KKM) lemma. In Section 2 of this paper, the Ky Fan minimax inequality, in a slightly generalized form, is used to prove that every compact Borel game whose mixed extension is diagonally transfer continuous has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, the mixed extension of a game is diagonally transfer continuous if the conventional assumptions hold: the extension is payo¤ secure and the game is upper semicontinuous-sum. Then, by introducing uniform diagonal security in Section 3, we extend the concept of uniform payo¤ security to diagonally transfer continuous games. In upper semicontinuoussum games, these two uniform conditions coincide. However, if a compact Borel game is uniformly diagonally secure, it has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which makes it possible to avoid verifying the reciprocal upper semicontinuity of the game's mixed extension.
Example 1 is a slight modi…cation of the Tullock rent-seeking game in which it is additionally assumed that the favor the players vie for may be granted to a third party with probability one-half if at least one player exerts no e¤ort at all. Notwithstanding the fact that the game is not better-reply secure, it is not only diagonally transfer continuous, it is also uniformly diagonally secure; that is, the game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
In Section 4 we introduce another uniform condition, called uniform hospitality. The notion of a hospitable game is based on the notion of a hospitable strategy, introduced by Duggan (2007) . Though uniform hospitality, in a certain sense, is stronger that uniform payo¤ security (see, e.g., Lemma 6), it might be useful in applications. For instance, all-pay auctions are both uniformly payo¤ secure and uniformly hospitable. At the same time, if, in a proof, some payo¤s are to be modi…ed, uniform hospitality tends to be used side by side with uniform payo¤ security.
In Section 5 we study the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in two player games on the unit square. The focus is on Theorem 5b of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . Bagh (2010) showed with the aid of examples that the hypotheses of Theorem 5b are not in full harmony with its proof and put forward a modi…cation of the theorem covering mostly Bertrand-Edgeworth games. The games covered by the modi…cation of Theorem 5b presented in Section 5 (Theorem 3) possess the following two properties: (a) they are uniformly payo¤ secure; (b) if a player's payo¤ is to be modi…ed at a discontinuity point (z; z), the player's payo¤ function is strongly uniformly hospitable at z. As an application of Theorem 3, a probabilistic spatial voting model from Ball (1999) is considered.
The Model and Some Facts
We consider a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , where I = f1; : : : ; ng, each player i's pure strategy set X i is a nonempty, compact subset of a metrizable topological vector space, and each payo¤ function u i is a bounded Borel measurable function from the Cartesian product X = i2I X i , equipped with the product topology, to R. Under these conditions, G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is called a compact Borel game. In this paper, by a game we mean a compact Borel game. The following de…nition of a payo¤ secure game was given by Reny (1999) .
i in some open neighborhood of x i . The game G is payo¤ secure if, for every x 2 X and every " > 0, each player i can secure a payo¤ of u i (x) " at x.
Payo¤ security can be reformulated in terms of transfer lower semicontinuity, due to Tian (1992) .
De…nition 2 Let Z and Y be two topological spaces. A function f : Z Y 7 ! R is -transfer lower semicontinuous in y if, for every (z; y) 2 Z Y , f (z; y) > implies that there exists some point z 0 2 Z and some neighborhood
semicontinuous in y if f is -transfer lower semicontinuous in y for every 2 R.
A game is payo¤ secure if and only if each player's payo¤ function is transfer lower semicontinuous in the other players'strategies (Prokopovych, 2011) .
For a subset B of a topological vector space X, we denote the interior of B in X by int X B, the boundary of B by @B, the closure of B by clB, and the convex hull of B by coB. In a metric space Y , we denote by B Y (y; r) the open ball centered at y and with radius r > 0. Denote by E G the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of G in X.
De…nition 3 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is better-reply secure if, whenever (x ; u ) 2 clGrG and x 2 XnE G , some player i can secure a payo¤ strictly above u i at x .
Reny's (1999) equilibrium existence theorem states that every compact, quasiconcave, better-reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Better-reply security is equivalent to transfer reciprocal upper semicontinuity in payo¤ secure games. 4 Another approach to studying the equilibrium existence problem in discontinuous games was proposed by Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) .
For G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , de…ne the following aggregator functions:
where, as usual, the i subscript on x stands for "all players except i,"
and
A strategy pro…le x 2 X is a Nash equilibrium of G i¤
De…nition 4 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is diagonally transfer continuous if, for every x 2 XnE G , there exist some d 2 X and some neighborhood
It is important to notice that G is diagonally transfer continuous i¤ F G is 0-transfer lower semicontinuos in x.
Every payo¤ secure game with an upper semicontinuous A 0 G is diagonally transfer continuous.
Lemma 1 If, in a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , each u i : X ! R is transfer lower semicontinuous in x i and the aggregator function A 0 G : X ! R is upper semicontinuous, then G is diagonally transfer continuous.
Proof. We shall …rst show that A G (d; x) is transfer lower semicontinuous in x. Let (d; x) 2 X X and 2 R be such that A G (d; x) > . Then there are 1 ; : : : ; n 2 R such that = 1 + : : : + n and u i (d i ; x i ) > i for all i 2 I. Since each u i is transfer lower semicontinuous in
G is upper semicontinuos on X, the transfer lower semicontinuity of A G in x implies the transfer lower semicontinuity of F G in x. Therefore F G is 0-transfer lower semicontinuous in x. Now we de…ne the mixed extension of a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I . Denote by 4(X i ) the set of Borel probability measures on X i and by ca(X i ) the set of Borel signed measures with …nite total variation on X i . A basic open neighborhood of i 2 ca(X i ) in the weak topology on ca(X i ) is a set of the form i 2 ca(X i ) :
; j = 1; : : : ; m for some f 1 ; : : : ; f m 2 C(X i ) and " > 0. The set ca(X i ) is a Hausdor¤ topological vector space equipped with the weak topology. The topology induced on 4(X i ) by the weak topology is compact. 5 Let each of the Cartesian products ca(X) = 5 In order to make 4(X i ) a subset of a linear space, we embed it in the space ca(X i ) of signed measures with …nite total variation on X i . Sometimes it is possible to proceed without the embedding (see, e.g., the proof of the compactness of the set of probability measures given by Glycopantis and Muir 2004) .
ca(X 1 ) : : : ca(X n ) and 4(X) = 4(X 1 ) : : : 4(X n ) be equipped with the product topology. The set ca(X) is a Hausdor¤ topological vector space in which the operations of addition and scalar multiplication are de…ned as follows: for = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 ca(X) and 2 R the scalar multiplication of by is the element given by = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ). The addition of = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 ca(X) and v = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 ca(X) gives + v = ( 1 + 1 ; : : : ; n + n ).
The mixed extension of the game G is the n-player normal form game = (4(X i ); U i ) i2I , where 4(X i ) is player i's strategy set and player i's payo¤ function U i : 4(X) ! R is de…ned by
: : :
Since Fubini's theorem holds in this context, the integral in the de…nition of player i's expected payo¤ is properly de…ned.
For the game , we also de…ne the aggregator functions A : 4(X) 4(X) ! R, A 0 : 4(X) ! R, and F : 4(X) 4(X) ! R (see the corresponding de…nitions for G).
Theorem 1 If the mixed extension of a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is diagonally transfer continuous, then G possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The set 4(X) is a compact, convex subset of ca(X). Consider the aggregator function F ( ; ) : 4(X) 4(X) ! R. Since F is linear in and 0-transfer lower semicontinuous in , the mixed extension of G has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies by the Ky Fan minimax inequality (see Lemma 9 in the Appendix). Another proof of Theorem 1 can be obtained by using the fact that every diagonally transfer continuous mixed extension has the single deviation property (see Reny, 2009, footnote 4; Reny, 2011, p. 19; Prokopovych, 2012 for some details).
Since the upper semicontinuity of A 0 G implies the upper semicontinuity of A 0 , verifying whether a game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibirum usually means verifying the following two properties: (a) the upper semicontinuity of the sum of the payo¤ functions; and (b) the payo¤ security of its mixed extension. If these properties hold, the mixed extension of the game is not only better-reply secure but, by Lemma 1, diagonally transfer continuous. The diagonal transfer continuity of a game does not imply that its mixed extension is diagonally transfer continuous. For instance, Sion and Wolfe's zero-sum game (Sion and Wolfe, 1957 ) is payo¤ secure (see Carmona, 2005 , Example 4) and its aggregator function A 0 G is constant. Thus, the game is diagonally transfer continuous by Lemma 1. However, since the game has no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, its mixed extension is not diagonally transfer continuous.
Uniform Security
An easily veri…able condition for the mixed extension of a game to be payo¤ secure is that of uniform payo¤ security, due to Monteiro and Page (2007) .
De…nition 5 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly payo¤ secure if, for every x i 2 X i and every " > 0, there is d i 2 X i such that, for every
It is useful to notice that: (a) replacing the pure deviation strategy d i in De…-nition 5 with a mixed deviation strategy i 2 4(X i ) would not a¤ect the validity of the proof of Theorem 1 of Monteiro and Page (2007) ; (b) uniform payo¤ security can be introduced in a pointwise manner. We will need the following de…nition. In
Corollary 1 If G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly payo¤ secure and its aggregator function A 0 G is upper semicontinuous, then the mixed extension is diagonally transfer continuous, and, therefore, G possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
The notion of a uniformly payo¤ secure game can be extended to diagonally transfer continuous games.
An upper semicontinuous-sum game G is uniformly diagonally secure if it is uniformly payo¤ secure.
Lemma 2 If a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly payo¤ secure and the aggregator function A 0 G : X ! R is upper semicontinuous, then G is uniformly diagonally secure.
Proof. Fix some d 2 X. By the uniform payo¤ security of G, for every " > 0 and each i 2 I, there is a deviation strategy d i 2 X i such that, for every x i 2 X i ,
Theorem 2 If a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly diagonally secure, then its mixed extension is diagonally transfer continuous, and, therefore, G possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows the lines of the proof of Theorem 1 of Monteiro and Page (2007) and is given in the Appendix.
The concept of uniform diagonal security may be of help in studying equilibirum existence in games whose aggregator function A 0 G is not upper semicontinuous.
Example 1 Consider a slight modi…cation of the rent-seeking game due to Tullock (1980) . Two players simultaneously bid for a political favor commonly known worth V dollars. Their bids, denoted by x 1 and x 2 , in ‡uence the probability of receiving the favor. Player i's strategy set is the segment [0; V ]. Let i (x 1 ; x 2 ) denote the probability player i wins. The function i , often called player i's contest success function, is speci…ed as follows:
where r > 0. Player i's payo¤ function u i is
The only di¤erence of the model from the Tullock rent-seeking game is the assumption that if the lowest bid submitted is equal to zero (or, in other words, at least one player exerts no e¤ort at all), the favor may be granted to a third party with probability one-half. Consequently, the aggregator function A 0 G is not upper semicontinuous.
Let, for speci…city, V = 2 and r = 3. In this case, the game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria (see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries 1994 for a related discussion). For instance, one can check that the only candidate point for being an interior solution is (1:5; 1:5), a strategy pro…le where both players get negative expected payo¤s. However, each of them can avoid getting a negative payo¤ by bidding zero.
To verify that the game is not better-reply secure, consider the sequence fx k g
) for k = 1; 2; : : : :Then the corresponding sequence of payo¤ vectors f(u 1 (x k ); u 2 (x k ))g converges to (1; 1). It is clear that no player can secure a payo¤ strictly above 1 at (0; 0). On the other hand, the game is not only diagonally transfer continuous, it is uniformly diagonally secure (see the Appendix for details). Therefore, the game possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Uniform Hospitality
In this section we extend the notion of a hospitable strategy, initially developed by Duggan (2007) for zero-sum games, to our framework.
is called hospitable if, for each i 2 I, every 2 4(X), and every " > 0, there is a hospitable strategy i such that
There is no ambiguity associated with the notation used in De…nition 7 since
Lemma 3 If G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is a hospitable game, then its mixed extension is payo¤ secure.
Proof. Fix some = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 4(X), " > 0, and i 2 I. We have to show that there are a strategy i 2 4(X i ) and a neighborhood N 4(X i ) ( i ) such that
4(X i ) ! R is continuous as well (see Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 15.5) . Therefore, there exists a neighborhood
Corollary 2 If G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is a hospitable game with an upper semicontinuous aggregator function A 0 G , then it has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
We now give some su¢ cient conditions for a game to be hospitable.
De…nition 9 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly hospitable if, for each i 2 I, every x i 2 X i , and every " > 0, there is a hospitable strategy i 2 4(X i ) such that
Lemma 4 Every uniformly hospitable game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is hospitable.
Proof. Fix some i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, 2 4(X), and " > 0. We have to show that there is a hospitable strategy i such that
First, pick a strategy
Since G is uniformly hospitable, there exists a hospitable strategy i 2 4(
From now on, we impose the additional assumption that each X i is a subset of a …nite-dimensional Euclidean space. Denote by i the Lebesgue measure on X i . The proof of the next lemma is based on some ideas from Duggan (2007, Propositions 2 and 3) and is relegated to the Appendix.
It is worth noticing that B + i (x i ; ") is not necessarily centered at x i . Assumption (i) of Lemma 5 is akin to the one-to-one assumption used by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, de…nitions on p. 7 and Example 4 on p. 21) and is not super ‡uous.
Example 2 Consider G = (X i ; u i ) i2f1;2g where X 1 = X 2 = [0; 1] and player i's payo¤ function is de…ned as follows:
It is easy to see that the sum of the payo¤ functions is upper semicontinuous on X. The game is compact, quasiconcave, and satis…es assumption (ii) of Lemma 5. However it has no mixed strategy Nash equilibria. To show this, assume, by way of contradiction, that the game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, = ( 1 ; 2 ). For each i 2 f1; 2g de…ne BR i : 4(X i ) 4(X i ) by
Since is a Nash equilibrium of , i 2 BR i ( i ) for i = 1; 2. Denote by x the Dirac measure concentrated at x 2 [0; 1]. If 1 (f0g) = 0, then BR 2 ( 1 ) = 1 . However, if 2 = 1 , then BR 1 ( 2 ) = 0 , and, therefore, 1 (f0g) = 1, a contradiction.
If 2 (f1g) = 0, then BR 1 ( 2 ) = 1 , which, in turn, implies that BR 2 ( 1 ) = 1 , another impossibility.
Therefore, both 1 (f0g) > 0 and 2 (f1g) > 0. Then the fact that 2 2 BR 2 ( 1 ) implies that U 2 ( 1 ; 1 ) U 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) for every 2 2 4(X 2 ). By de…nition,
Fix some " 2 (0; 1 (f0g)) and pick some x 0 2 close enough to one such that u 2 (x 1 ; x 0 2 ) > u 2 (x 1 ; 1) " for every
) u 2 (0; 1)) " > 0, which contradicts the initial premise that is a Nash equilibrium of .
In …nite-dimensional applications, it is sometimes possible to apply the notion of a uniformly hospitable game in place of the notion of a uniformly payo¤ secure game.
Example 3 Consider the following uniformly payo¤ secure game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I (see Monteiro and Page, 2007, Example 1; Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1996) .
There are n bidders, competing for an object with a known value of unity. Each player i submits a sealed bid b i 2 [0; 1]. Let b = max i2I b i , H = fi 2 I : b i = b g, and jHj be the cardinality of H. Bidder i's payo¤ is as follows: 
Uniform Conditions in Two Player Games on the Unit Square
Theorem 5b of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) (hereinafter called Theorem 5b) is an important equilibrium existence result in which the assumption that the sum of the players' payo¤s functions is upper semicontinuous is relaxed. As shown by Bagh (2010) with the aid of examples, the proof of Theorem 5b is not in full harmony with its statement. The modi…cation of the theorem proposed by Bagh (2010, Theorem 5.1) is applicable mostly to Bertrand-Edgeworth games (see also Remark 1 below). Making use of the concepts of uniform payo¤ security and uniform hospitality leads us to another modi…cation of Theorem 5b.
We consider a two-player game G = (X i ; u i ) i2f1;2g on the unit square, X = X 1 
The game G = (X i ; u i ) i2f1;2g is strongly uniformly hospitable if each u i is strongly uniformly hospitable at every x i 2 X i . The set X consists of three subsets: 
Proof. Since u i is strongly uniformly hospitable at x i , for every " > 0 there exists (") 2 Rnf0g such that
. We have to show that, for every x i 2 X i , there exists a neighborhood
If
, and we can choose a suitable neighborhood
for all w i 2
The next lemma states that any game covered by Theorem 5b is uniformly payo¤ secure.
Lemma 7 Consider a two-player game G = (X i ; u i ) i2f1;2g on the unit square X = [0; 1] [0; 1]. Assume that (i) there are continuous functions l j i : clS j ! R, i = 1; 2; j = 1; 2 such that u i (x) = l j i (x) for all x 2 S j and all i; j 2 f1; 2g;
(ii) for each i 2 f1; 2g and every x 2 S, there exists j 2 f1; 2g such that
Then G is uniformly payo¤ secure.
Proof. Fix some i 2 f1; 2g, x i 2 (0; 1), and " > 0. Then, by (ii), there exists j 2 f1; 2g such that l
. Suppose that i = 1 and j = 2. The rest of the cases can be handled similarly.
Since l 1 1 and l 2 1 are uniformly continuous on their respective compact domains, there exists 2 (0; minfx 1 ; 1 x 1 g) such that, for each j 2 f1; 2g, l
for all x 0 and x 00 in clS j with kx 0 x 00 k < , where kx 0 x 00 k denotes the Euclidean distance between x 0 and x 00 .
We shall show that, for any …xed
x 2 ) and (x 1 ; x 2 ) lie in the same S j and, therefore,
Thus we conclude that each u i is strongly uniformly hospitable at every x i 2 (0; 1), which, by Lemma 6, implies that u i is uniformly transfer lower semicontinuous in
It is not di¢ cult to see that u i need not be strongly uniformly hospitable at x i = 0 or at x i = 1. However it is still uniformly transfer lower semicontinuous in x i at those x i 's. For instance, if x i = 0 and l It is clear that for every " > 0 and every x i 2 X i , there exists a neighborhood
, then it is not di¢ cult to show that u i is strongly uniformly hospitable at x i = 0 by repeating the above argument.
In addition to all-pay auctions, Lemma 7 is applicable to …rst-price and secondprice sealed-bid auctions, a number of location games and voting models. If the hypotheses of Lemma 7 are satis…ed for a game and the game is upper semicontinuoussum, then it has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Another important corollary of Lemma 7 is that modi…cations of payo¤s similar to those used by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) in the proof of Theorem 5b do not lead out of the class of uniformly payo¤ secure games.
We need one more auxiliary lemma. Denote
Lemma 8 Consider a two-player game G = (X i ; u i ) i2f1;2g on the unit square X = [0; 1] [0; 1]. Suppose that the hypotheses of Lemma 7 hold and (i) for every point x = (z; z) 2 S D , there exist i; j 2 f1; 2g and some sequence f(x k i ; z)g S j converging to x such that lim n!1 l j i (x k i ; z) > u i (x); (ii) if, for some i; j 2 f1; 2g and some sequence f(x
Then each u i is strongly uniformly hospitable at any z 2 X i such that (z; z) 2 S D .
Proof. As we have shown in the proof of Lemma 7, each u i is strongly uniformly hospitable at every x i 2 (0; 1). Let (0; 0) 2 S D (the argument is similar if (1; 1) 2 S D ). We shall show that both u 1 and u 2 are strongly uniformly hospitable at 0. Since (0; 0) 2 S D , l (ii) for each i 2 f1; 2g and every x 2 S, there exists j 2 f1; 2g such that
(iii) for every point x = (z; z) 2 S D , there exist i; j 2 f1; 2g and some sequence f(x
iv) if, for some i; j 2 f1; 2g and some sequence f(x
. Then G has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
As shown by Example A.1 of Bagh (2010) , Theorem 5b lacks an assumption regarding the players'payo¤s along the main diagonal of the unit square. The extra assumption that the restriction of A 0 G to S is a continuous function plays a crucial role in Theorem 3. At the same time, some hypotheses of Theorem 3 are weaker than their counterparts in Theorem 5b. For instance, (iii) and (iv) are to be held only on S D , not at every point of discontinuity.
Proof. It is not di¢ cult to see that S D = fx 2 S : max j2f1;2g fl The plan of the proof is similar to that used by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, Theorem 5b) . First we will modify payo¤s on S D so as to make the sum of the payo¤ functions upper semicontinuous on X.
De…ne the modi…ed payo¤ functions as follows: for i 2 f1; 2g, b u i (x) = u i (x) for all x 2 XnS D , and
Since S D is Borel, each b u i is Borel measurable on X. By Lemma 7, the game b G = (X i ; b u i ) i2f1;2g is uniformly payo¤ secure. In order to show that A
for any such sequence. We have to consider two cases: (a) x 2 S D ; and (b) x 2 rbdS D , where rbdS D denotes the boundary of S D in S. De…ne J i : S f1; 2g by J i (x) = fj 2 f1; 2g :
. Now consider a sequence fx k g lying in S D . Since x 2 S D , J i (x) 6 = ? for at least one i 2 f1; 2g. Let us show that each J i has open lower sections; that is, if j 2 J i (x), then j 2 J i (w) for all w in some open neighborhood N S (x) of x in S. Assume, by way of contradiction, that, despite the fact that fx k g tends to x and j 2
for each k. Since the restriction of A 0 G to S is continuous, there is no loss in generality to assume that l 
, there is no loss of generality to assume that l
However, by (iv), l
We have to consider two cases: (a) J 1 (x) 6 = ? and J 2 (x) 6 = ?; and (b) J i (x) 6 = f?g for some i and
If there are i; j 2 f1; 2g such that j 2 J i (x k ) and J i (x k ) = f?g for in…nitely
Since u 1 (x) + u 2 (x) max t2f1;2g fl 
Let, without loss of generality, j = i. By Lemma 8, b u i is strongly uniformly hospitable at z. That is, for every " > 0, there exists (") > 0 such that z + (") 2 [0; 1] and, for every
Since b is a mixed strategy equilibrium of b G and, by construction, b U i ( ) U i ( ) for each i 2 f1; 2g and every 2 4(X), we conclude that b is also a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G.
in some cases, assuming that the restriction of A 0 G to S is only upper semicontinuous would not be su¢ cient for the purposes of Theorem 3 even if assumption (ii) of Theorem 3 were replaced with the stronger assumption (iv) of Theorem 5.1 of Bagh (2010) . On the other hand, it is useful to notice that the restrictions of b u 1 and b u 2 to S need not be reciprocally upper semicontinuous (see Bagh, 2010 Bagh, , p. 1265 , for the de…nition) if the restrictions of u 1 and u 2 to S are reciprocally upper semicontinuous.
Example 4 demonstrates that Theorem 3 can be used in place of Theorem 5b to replicate the equilibrium existence results obtained by Ball (1999) .
Example 4 Consider the following spatial voting model (see Ball, 1999, Example 1) . Two candidates are competing in an election for public o¢ ce. The electorate is distributed uniformly along the ideological spectrum [0; 1]. During the electoral campaign, each candidate i announces, simultaneously with the other candidate, a platform, denoted by x i . The probability P i (x i ; x i ) that candidate i candidate wins the election is de…ned as follows:
for 0 x i < x i 1;
for 0 x i = x i 1;
for 0 x i < x i 1:
As in Ball (1999, p. 541) , candidates 1 and 2's policy preferences on [0; 1] are represented by h 1 (z) = 1 2
(z 1)
2 and h 2 (z) = 1 2 z 2 . The candidates are assumed to be o¢ ce-motivated. Let the candidates'o¢ ce motivation parameters be k 1 = :05 and k 2 = 3, respectively. Then candidate i's payo¤ function is
The game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. It is strongly uniformly hospitable since S D = Snf( ). Obviously, the restriction of u 1 + u 2 to the main diagonal of the unit square is a continuous function. By Theorem 3, the game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 9 Let X be a compact convex set in a Hausdor¤ topological vector space, and let f : X X R satisfy: (i) f (x; x) 0 for each x 2 X; (i) f ( ; y) is quasiconcave for each y 2 X, (ii) f is 0-transfer lower semicontinuous in y. Then there exists y 2 X such that f (x; y) 0 for all x 2 X.
Lemma 9 can be shown in a number of ways. Its conventional proofs are based either on the KKM lemma or on Browder's …xed point theorem, which are two equivalent results (see, for an in-depth discussion, Yannelis 1991). Let us give an outline of the proof using Browder's …xed point theorem. It proceeds by assuming, to the contrary, that, for each y 2 X, there exists x 2 X such that f (x; y) > 0. Then the correspondence M : X X de…ned by M (y) = fx 2 X : f (x; y) > 0g has nonempty values. The quasiconcavity of f in x implies that M has convex values. Since f is 0-transfer lower semicontinuous in y, M has a multivalued selection with open lower sections (see, e.g., Prokopovych, 2011 for details), denoted by M 0 : X X. Then, by Lemma 5.1 of Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) , the convex-valued correspondence
also has open lower sections. Therefore, by Browder's …xed point theorem, the selection has a …xed point, which contradicts (i).
Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 4(X)nE . Then there exists 2 4(X) such that
Since is a vector of probability measures, there exists d = (d 1 ; : : : 
The lower semicontinuity of F G in x implies that F (d; ) : 4(X) ! R is lower semicontinuous (see Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 15.5) . Consequently,
for all 0 2 N 4(X) ( ), which means that is diagonally transfer continuous.
Proof of Lemma 5
We have to show that for each i 2 I, every x i 2 X i , and every " > 0, there is a hospitable strategy i 2 4(X i ) such that U i ( i ; x i ) > u i (x i ; x i ) " for every
Fix some i 2 I, x i 2 X i , and " > 0. Let i denote the uniform probability measure on
for every Borel subset C of B + i (x i ; "), therefore, i is absolutely continuous with respect to i . Since U i ( i ; x i ) > u i (x i ; x i ) " for every x i 2 X i , the only fact left to be proven is that i is a hospitable strategy.
Consider some x i 2 X i and a sequence of fx
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Example 1: Details
Let us show that the game described in Example 1 with V = 2 and r = 3 is uniformly diagonally secure. Let d 2 X and, without loss of generality, " 2 (0; 1).
as follows:
For any x 2 (0; 1] denote by y(x) 2 (0; x) the root of the equation . We will often use the fact that y(x) < x for every x 2 (0; 1].
There are a number of cases to consider. Case 1. Let d = (0; 0).
. We shall show that for every x 2 X, there exists a neighborhood
If w = (w 1 ; 0) with w 1 > 0, then, since
If w = (w 1 ; w 2 ) with w 1 w 2 > 0, then
Let It is obvious that F G (d; w) F G (d; x) > " for all w 2 N X (x).
For x = (x 1 ; x 2 ) with x 1 x 2 > 0, F G (d; x) = u 1 (d 1 ; x 2 ) (V x 1 x 2 ). There exists 0 < < minf"; g). For w = (w 1 ; w 2 ) 2 N X (x) we have F G (d; w) = u 1 (d 1 ; w 2 ) + u 2 (w 1 ; d 2 ) (V w 1 w 2 ). Therefore, F G (d; w) F G (d; x) > ".
